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Introduction
The accounting, management science, and economics literature contains
numerous models addressing the resource allocation and transfer pricing problems.
Some of the earliest statements on the latter problem are recorded by Hirshleifer
[14] and [15], Dean [6], and Cook [A], These authors suggest solutions to the
transfer pricing problem which reflect the analogy of the internal price problem
to the determination of the (competitive) market price of traditional economics.
The advent of mathematical programming produced another stream of articles address-
ing the transfer price problem,, especially after the relation between a decentralized
firm and the Dantzig and Wolfe [5] decomposition principle was stated by Whinston
[26] and Baumol and Fabian [1] . Accountants as well as economists and management
scientists, have all jumped on the band wagon of mathematical programming solutions
1/
to the transfer pricing problem.
The purpose of this paper is not to set forth another elaborate mathe-
matical programming model. Rather, the paper attempts to place the solutions
proposed by these models and other traditional solutions in an appropriate context.
Since the transfer pricing problem only arises within a recognizable social system
(be it an organization or a socialist economy) the paper considers the solutions
2/
in a social system context so that their usefulness and limitations can be evaluated.
We begin by discussing some important , but confusing terminology.
_1/ See for example such authors as: Dopuch and Drake [7], Godfrey [10], Ruefli
[22], Hass [13], and Gordon [12].
2/ In this paper we only consider an organizational context, but there seems to
be a direct analogy to a planned (or socialist) economy.
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Decentralization and Differentiation
Decentralization is one approach to organizational design. Implicit in
this approach is the segmentation of the organization into various specialities.
Numerous reasons are provided in the transfer price literature for decentralization.
For example, Dean [6] suggests, "...the modern integrated multiple product firm
-functions best if it is made into a miniature of the competitive free enterprise
system." Dopuch and Drake [7] suggest that division managers are in a better
position to process information concerning resource allocation. Along a similar
vein Ronen and McKinney [21] argue that the division manager's nearness to the
market place provides relevant information regarding changes in prices of inputs
and outputs and that more effective coordination of production factors should be
rbtained at the divisional level. Reasons such as size and diversity of modern
corporations and the promotion of morale (because of the decision-making autonomy
of managers) are also offered in support of decentralization (Godfrey [10]). While
each of these reasons may be true, none of the authors have offered a coherent
theory of decentralization. Consequently, the implications, the authors see, of
decentralization for transfer pricing, are fairly restricted and pragmatic.
We consider the central problem facing complex organizations is one of
coping with uncertainty. This is the view many current organizational theorists
propose. Similarly, we identify the two major sources of uncertainty for a complex
organization as its technology and its environment. An organization's design,
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3/
then, represents a response to these sources of uncertainty. Specifically,
an organization may create parts to deal with the uncertainty and thereby leave
other parts to operate under conditions of near certainty, that is, the organization
will decentralize. Decentralization is a response to uncertainty.
Decentralization, however, does not quite explain the process involved.
A consequence of the segmentation of the organization into parts (departments,
divisions, etc.) is that the behavior of organizational members will be influenced
by the segmentation. Because of the differences in the nature of the task and in
the environmental uncertainty facing various segments, the organizational members
will develop different working styles and cognitive structures. Therefore, we
use the term differentiation to include not only the segmentation of the organization
into specialized parts, but also to include the consequent differences in attitudes
and behavior of organizational members.
However, differentiation is only one design problem facing the organi-
zation. The other side of the same coin, and another design problem, is integration.
Organizational Integration
A basic organizational dilemma is that the more successful an organization
•is in achieving the requisite differentiation (especially those organizations
requiring significant differentiation) the more difficulty the organization has in
_3/ The exact roles technology and environment play in determining organizational
design is still the subject of research; e.g., Woodward [27], Burns and Stalker
[3], Lawrence and Lorsch [17], Mohr [19], Thompson [25], Pugh, et. al. [20].
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achieving the necessary integration. Lawrence and Lorsch [17] in their research
demonstrated that the most successful firms (in terms of the traditional measures
of profitability) in the various industries studied were the firms that achieved
the required differentiation and were then able to integrate the diverse units.
In dealing with the topic, organizational structure, Thompson [25] has
proposed that all organizations face environments which are located simultaneously
somewhere on two qontinua, a homogeneous-heterogeneous continuum and a stable-
shifting continuum. The interaction of Che two can be illustrated in a 2 x 2
diagram.
Stable Shifting
Homogeneous I II
Heterogeneous III IV
If these two continua are collasped into one certainty-uncertainty dimension
(basically the Lawrence and Lorsch [17] framework) the following partial ordering
is obtained.
4/ (i) Lawrence and Lorsch [17] also subsume technological questions as part of
the environmental certainty-uncertainty question.
(ii) This conception was developed without the knowledge of a recent publication
of Lawrence and Lorsch [18]. In this article they recognize the similarity
of their framework to that of Thompson's [25]. However, they are not as
explicit as our explanation and do not suggest the partial-ordering that
seems obtainable.
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^•*\ certain
III II
IV uncertain
In the present exposition we will confine our discussion to the extremes of the
5/
certainty-uncertainty continuum, that is, to cells I and IV above.
We now wish to introduce three concepts of interdependence explored by
6/-
Thompson [25]. These are, pooled, sequential, and reciprocal interdependence.
Pooled interdependence is a situation in which each part of the organization renders
a discrete contribution to the whole and each is supported by the whole. The parts
y
do not interact directly with one another. Sequential interdependence is a
situation in which, in addition to the pooled aspect, direct interaction between
the units can be pinpointed and the order of that interdependence specified.
Reciprocal interdependence refers to the situation in which the outputs of two
units become inputs for each other. The three types of interdependence are, in
the order indicated, increasingly difficult to coordinate.
5/ The general outline of the argument to be presented later can obviously be
expanded to cells II and III, but for the present initial exposition con-
centrating on cells I and IV seems sufficiently ambitious.
6/ (i) We are considering interdependence basically from a technological and
resource allocation viewpoints, although interdependence may also arise
through the environment (for example, from operating in common input and
output markets) . Environmental interdependence is not excluded although
we believe the most important aspect of the environment is the certainty-
uncertainty dimension.
(ii) Thompson's framework is not the only one that could be adopted. Emery
[8], for example, provides the following breakdown: (a) technological
—
of three types, serial, parallel, and feedback; (b) environmental and
(c) resource allocation.
TJ This is basically the situation where the only major common organizational link
among subunits is some scarce organizational resource, for example, capital.
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These three types of interdependence and cells I and IV of the certainty-
uncertainty continuum provide a useful framework within which to consider transfer
pricing. The framework is diagrammed below.
^"s^ Environmental
^•s^ Unc er ta inty
Organizational"^^
Interdependence n<
Certain Uncertain
Pooled A D
Sequential B E
Reciprocal C F
The cells in the above diagram represent different degrees of difficulty
in integrating organizational units. Integration becomes more difficulty as environ-
mental uncertainty increases and as organizational interdependence increases.
From this we can obtain the following partial order for the dimension, difficulty
of integration.
least difficult
most difficult

-7-
Since the problem of integration becomes more difficult as we move from A to F
we should expect the mechanisms used for obtaining the required integration to
change. We now turn to a discussion of a hierarchy of integrating mechanisms.
One list of integrating mechanisms, from the least elaborate to the
most elaborate, is indicated below. This list is adapted from an article by
Galbraith [9].
1. Rules, Routines, Standardization
2. Organization Hierarchy
3. Planning
4. Direct Contact
5. Liason Roles
6. Temporary Committees (task forces or teams)
7. Integrators
8. Integrating Departments
9. Matrix Organization
All organizations employ the first three or four mechanisms. These mechanisms
are sufficient for integrating many organizational functions and are probably
all that is needed by organizations facing minimal environmental and technological
demands. However, when environmental and technological demands become more complex,
organizations become more differentiated and this increases the problem of integra-
tion. Consequently, more sophisticated integrating mechanisms (for example 7, 8,
and 9), in addition to the simpler mechanisms, are required. Although the stage
of current research does not allow us to be precise about the relationship between
these mechanisms and our framework (partial order) developed earlier, some tentative
suggestions can be made. Simply put, organizations in cells A, B, and D are most
8/ (i) Galbraith [9] actually expands this list somewhat especially with regard
to organizational planning.
(ii) Thompson [25] has provided a somewhat different list. He suggests three
mechanisms for achieving integration, coordination by standardization,
coordination by planning, and coordination by mutual adjustment. The first
two mechanisms we present correspond to Thompson's No. 1, while mechanisms
4 to 9 (lateral mechanisms in Galbrath's terminology) correspond to Thompson's
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Organizational
Cell
Integrating Mechanisms Employed
More Frequently Less Frequently
A 1, 2, & 3 4
B 1, 2, & 3 4 & 5
D 1, 2, & 3 4 & 5
C 1 through 6 7
E 1 through 7 8
F 1 through 7 8 & 9
likely to employ integrating mechanisms 1 through 5 while organizations in cells
C, E, and F will use a wider range of integrating mechanisms.
Differentiation, Integration, and Management Accounting
The amount of differentiation required is determined primarily by
technological and environmental demands, and an organizations adaptation to these
depands is reflected in the first instance by the organizational design. The
accountant, in designing the management accounting system, needs to consider the
requisite degree of differentiation, a constraint. That is, the accountant cannot
create or demand differentiation when behavioral factors dictate otherwise.
This is not to say the management accounting system has no part to play
in organizational design. In fact, the accounting system can be designed to
facilitate or enhance the differentiation achieved. For example, each of the
concepts, expense center, profit center and investment center may be employed
_9/ Goldschmidt [11] is one author who appears to assume otherwise. However, we contend
that In cases such as this, the differentiation is quite artificial. As a side
point, this artificiality is probably one reason for the noticed dysfunctional
behavioral consequences of some management information systems.
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depending upon the differentiation required by the technological and environ-
mental demands. When the appropriate accounting techniques are used in conjunction
with required organizational design we expect the claimed benefits of decentrali-
zation to be realized.
We are now in the position to consider the role of the accounting system
in integration. An accounting system is a well defined formal information system
"within an organization. Basically, it is a set of rules and standard procedures.
The accounting system can thus be classified as an integrating mechanism primarily
of the first type above. In more complicated integrating situations while the
accounting system (or, more precisely, the costs and prices generated by the
accounting system) may be helpful in obtaining integration this will only be one
input to the integrating process.,
Dif f entiation, Integration and Transfer Pricing
Essentially we have argued that "he requisite differentiation has to be
taken as a given by the accountant when he designs an organization's formal control
and reporting sub-systems. In some cases there will be a one to one mapping between
the differentiated units and the accountant's responsibility centers, that is
(
the
10 / For one listing of these claimed benefits "automatically" arising from decentral-
ization see page 693 of Horngren [16].
11 / Budgeting and planning are also usually considered part of the management
accounting system. Notice, however, that planning has also been classed as
fairly simple or routine integrating mechanism.
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expense, profit and investment centers. However, when there isn't this convenient
mapping we would argue that the behavioral factors dominate, and that the accountant
should not try to impose differentiation through the creation of artificial
responsibility centers.
What then is the role of transfer pricing? Obviously, once responsibility
centers are established goods and services transfered among these units need to be
priced. This helps separate and pinpoint responsibility for different aspects of
the firms functioning. In other words, to some extent, the transfer pricing
mechanism enhances differentiation. But, we have also demonstrated above that
differentiation is only one part of the problem. Integration is another facet of
this problem. Can the transfer pricing mechanism be used to help achieve the
required integration? Again the answer is obviously "yes." In many cases the
pricing mechanism is a routine or standardized process, a formula like, for example,
standard cost, cost plus, marginal cost, a fixed price, etc. This type of transfer
pricing is at least applicable in simple integrating situations although in more
complicated integrating situations it may be only one input to the integrating
process
.
Mathematical Programming Solutions to the Transfer Pricing Problem
As stated in the introduction to this paper many of the papers proposing
programming solutions to the transfer price problem rely on the interpretation of
the decomposition principle as a model of decision making in a decentralized firm.
While the anology Is undoubtedly useful for analyzing some situations the methodology
appears to have some limitations.
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The first limitation of these approaches is that they maintain only
the facade of decentralized decision making. The last phase of the process is
usually dictated by central management. For example, in the Baumol and Fabian
[1] model, although the optimal divisional plan will be a weighted average of the
plans submitted by the division, the weights are entirely determined by central
-.management . Godfrey [10] in evaluating the Baumol and Fabian article and the more
recent refinements to their model says:
"Despite the appeal of the decomposition technique, in our
opinion, it is still a highly centralized decision making
procedure. The divisions are at the mercy of central head-
quarters and would probably not agree that they enjoy the
autonomy of decision making that is intended."—'
There seems to be two explanations for this problem. The first is that
many authors of the programming solutions are primarily interested in the mathe-
matical properties (or elegance) of their solutions and only secondly to the
model's organizational implications. The second is that most authors in the
transfer price literature are asking the question, "What transfer price will
result in the decentralized firm maximizing joint (or corporate) profits?" Since
the emphasis is on the maximization of joint profits whenever conflict arises
between this goal and the decentralization philosophy, the latter tends to be
sacrificed. The solution is always centralized decision making whether this is
12/ Godfrey [10], pp. 289-290. Godfrey also uses the decomposition approach in
his short-run planning model but freely admits it is a centralized decision
making model.
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through some stated price rule, a wishful appeal to competitive market prices and
^heir_surrogates or to mathematical programming solutions. The result is pre-
dictable since none of these authors has offered a coherent theory for decentralization.
A second limitation of these approaches is that they concentrate on the
w
behaviorally simple integration problems. In our framework they concentrate
basically on cells A and B (and possibly D) . The environments are stable and the
interdependencies are of the simplist kinds (pooled or at most, sequential). This
.. is—true even in the latest articles in the area. Ruefli [22] and [23], for example,
developes a decomposition model which can be interpreted as a representation of
decision making in a three-level hierarchial organization like that reproduced
. below. Ruelf i assumes pooled interdependence at the management unit level and
Central Unit
Management
Unit 1
Operating
Unit
1,1
Operating
Unit
n ,1
Management
Unit k
Operating
Unit
l,k
*, t
Operating
Unit
j>k
...
Operating
Unit
n ,k
k
Management
Unit m
Operating
Unit
l,m
Operating
Unit
n ,m
m
13/ (i) We are using mathematical programming models as the example. However,
the same argument could be made against the economic solutions and against
the traditional accounting solutions.
(ii) We are not arguing against the future development of programming models.
Even the development of more efficient algorithms for handling already
solved problems is undoubtedly important.
14 / Ruefli's model, as he notes, is easily generalizable to an n-level hierarchial
model.
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sequential interdependence at the operating level (but only within a management
unit). Thus he doesn't deal with sequential interdependence between inter-
aanagement unit operating units (for example, between operating units j,k and l,m)
16/
nor with reciprocal interdependence.
.The Case Against Negotiated Prices
The uae/of negotiated prices has rarely been seriously entertained by
those writing in the transfer price literature. Joel Dean [6] pressed for negotiated
prices but in such a way that they simulated a competitive market. The foundation
for his recommendations really lay in the availability of markets outside the
decentralized firm. Cook [4] also discussed the use of "free negotiation" but
proceeds to point out two disadvantages;
1. the amount of executive time it is likely to take, and
2. negotiated prices may distort the profit center's financial
17/
reports
.
However, Cook does suggest, "...if managers are sophisticated and equipped with
good accounting data on their operations, such a free negotiation system could
satisfy the basic criteria outlined above; that is, a transfer price that will not
16/ In his second article Ruefli [23] does mention, with regard to behavioral
externalities, the question of bi-directional effects (reciprocal inter-
dependence) for operational units within a management unit. However, he does
not propose any solution (see p. B-652) . Ruefli [23] even proposes an inte-
grating mechanism (a behavioral center) which he says could be a liaison
arrangement, a joint planning committee, etc. However, this behavioral center seems
to act very similarly to the central management unit and consequently be
subject to the same "centralization" criticism.
17/ One, often mentioned, example of this is when one division occupies a monopoly
position.
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lead to transfers which will reduce the company's profit but will permit and
18/
encourage any transfer which increases the company's profit." Dopuch and
Drake [7] also seem to be concerned about Cook's second point above when they
state:
"In evaluating the resulting performances of the divisional
managers, however, the central management may be evaluating
their ability to negotiate rather than their ability to control
economic variables. Accordingly, the information economies
of decentralization may be more apparent than real." —
'
Later in their paper, when discussing the decomposition procedure solutions Dopuch
and Drake suggest:
"The relevent point is that, if this method can be applied in
practice, it will provide a basis for negotiation between the
departmental and central management levels. In this respect
it would not be necessary for the divisional managers to
negotiate with each other. This in itself may be an advantage
since situations of negotiation between divisional managers
may degenerate into personal conflicts." —
'
Although there is undoubtedly some truth to each of these observations,
that is, at times negotiated transfer prices may have these dysfunctional effects,
we believe a very strong case can be made for the use of negotiated transfer prices.
In presenting this case we will also be suggesting a way for obtaining suitable
transfer prices for the complicated integrating situations of cells C, E, and F.
18 / Cook [4], p. 93. Unfortunately, (technically) sophisticated managers and
good accounting data are probably not sufficient conditions for insuring
proper integration. Dean [6] also suggests the position of "price mediator"
for a company when initially installing his system. These ideas are similar
to the concept of an integrator which we will discuss later.
19 / Dopuch and Drake [7], p. 13.
20/ Ibid
., p. 18.
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.Xransfer Prices and Conflict Resolution
Blake and Moulton [2] suggest fi e methods of conflict resolution.
Lawrence and Lorsch [17] in their research were able to isolate three of these
conflict resolution mechanisms in the firms they studied. One of their most
interesting results was that the successful firms facing the uncertain environ-
ments were able to resolve effectively interdepartmental conflict, and the most
important means of resolving this conflict was confrontation, that is, negotiation.
This effective resolution of interdepartmental conflict seemed to be an important
reason why these successful firms could achieve a high degree of integration as
well as the high degree of differentiation demanded by their uncertain environment.
A second point worth noting is that in any situation conflict is going
to be multi-dimensional. In a highly differentiated organization this will at
times involve the transfer and pricing of goods and services within the organiza-
tion. Seen in this light, the transfer pricing question becomes one facet of a
111
multi-dimensional conflict resolution process. If the appropriate conflict
resolution process is negotiation, then it appears the transfer price should be one
_23/
•arrived at through negotiation.
21/
21 / Forcing, was also an important back-up means.
22 / Hence, it makes little sense to be concerned about a possible monopoly position
by one department. It is unlikely, if at all possible, in uncertain environ-
ments or reciprocally interdependent situations (or both) that one department
will have a monopoly position on all dimensions of the conflict.
23/ This general argument for negotiated prices could probably be extended into
the simpler integrating situations. Resolving conflict in part depends upon
how close the protagonists' expectations of a suitable solution point are (see
Schelling [24] for a clearly stated exposition of this point). The similarity
of expectations is also a function of the complexity of the situation. Thus,
it could be argued that when environmental demands or organizational under-
-
-dependencies or their interaction are least complex, expectations of a mutually
agreeable solution point are closest and so the conflict is easily resolved.
This seems to be, for example, the conditions when a competitive market transfer
price can be established. In other words, the market based transfer price is a
limiting (or simple) case of negotiated prices.
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Implications for Research on Transfer Prices
The obvious implication is that we need to know something about conflict
resolution processes. In particular, we would like to know how accounting data is,
or can be, used in a conflict situation. It may be, for example, that accounting
data is completely irrelevant or unimportant In the more difficult integrating
situations. Alternatively (and hopefully this is at least the case) we may find
some accounting data useful and other accounting data less useful. It may even
be that we need to develop new kinds of data for these tougher areas.
Let lis for the monent consider a difficult integrating situation—one that
requires a formal integrator to successfully integrate the differentiated units.
What can we say about this situation? First, although the protagonists may have
different working styles, time horizons, etc. (because they are part of a differen-
tiated firm facing different sub parts of the organizational environment), they are
still members of the one organization and consequently have some attributes in common.
There is some basis therefore for believin~ agreement can always be attained. Second,
- successful integration will depend largely on the skill of the integrator and how
the personnel in the differentiated units perceive him. Lawrence and Lorsch [17],
for example, have suggested three prerequisites for a successful integrator:
1. .He should possess orientations equidistant among the
departments being integrated;
2. He should be seen as having an important voice in
decisions, because of both positional authority and
knowledge based authority, and
24 / Again notice Dean [6] argues along a similar line when discussing his successful
price mediator. He suggests the prime role of the mediator is not to dictate a
price but to keep the negotiations flowing until there is a settlement.
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3. He should be rewarded on the basis of the combined performance
of all the departments he is integrating, rather than just one
department.
Third, from a strictly accounting viewpoint, instead of giving point estimates to
all the parties on the "correct" transfer price (as, for example, the output of a
mathematical program) we may wish to provide guides to simply bound the solution
25/
area. These bounds could then reflect other accounting restraints on the
transfer price (fqr example, the fact that the transfer price may be used in the
evaluation of the economic performance of the units) . However, within the guides
set the final transfer price is a result of the confrontation process.
If we move to a more complicated integrating situation requiring an inte-
grating department some members of this department may need to be experts in internal
financial matters. The implications of this and the wider implications of a matrix
organization, for management accounting practice, are still very open questions.
Conclusion
We have attempted to place the transfer pricing question in a relevant
hehavioral setting. Briefly, we suggest the management accountant needs to consider
—organizational differentiation a constraint in designing the management accounting
25 / (i) For example, the variable costs of the input units may represent a lower
bound and the selling price less the variable costs of the output units
may represent a upper bound. We may also give the integrator various
other combinations of cost data to facilitate his integrating role (for
example, full costs (plus a markup), the mathematical programming
solutions, etc)
.
(ii) These behavioral questions obviously require future empirical verification
or falsification.
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system but that the system can be designed to enhance the differentiation achieved.
The Management accounting system can also facilitate integration. The transfer
pricing mechanism, being part of the management accounting system, can also
enhance differentiation and facilitate integration. We then suggested a paradigm
within which the appropriateness of various transfer pricing mechanisms can be
evaluated.
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